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1 Introduction
Over the last ten years, increasing attention has been paid to the interconnections
in financial institutions networks and at their consequences on credit risks and failures.
Though not always precisely defined, systemic risk has become a "buzz word" for many
studies in numbers of fields ranging from micro-structure of financial markets to monetary
policies and regulation rules. Much efforts have been devoted to measure the consequences
of contagious failures, assessing their likelihood in actual financial networks, evaluating the
efficiency of mitigating policies such as the control of capital flows (according to the Basel
agreements), the comprehensive use of central clearing houses (according either to the
European EMIR or the US Dodd-Frank act regulation rules) or the bailout commitment
by lenders of last resort. Allen and Gale (2000) first addressed the question by specific
examples (see also Acemoglu et al. (2015)). They showed in particular that a trade-off
may arise between the lowering of risks at an individual level allowed by diversification
and the implied increased risk of contagion at the industry level (this line of work has been
further investigated by Battiston et al. (2012a,b)). Several attempts have been made to
enlarge the initial scope either by looking at real-life examples (see, among others, Elsinger
et al. (2006); Gauthier et al. (2012)) or by simulations (see, for instance Nier et al. (2007);
Alessandri et al. (2009); Georg (2013)).1
However, as usual for studies with network structures, it is particularly difficult to pro-
vide clear-cut general results that apply whatever the graph considered. In this respect, the
work by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) has emerged as a building stone for many papers. This
work deals with a pure resolution problem (it is explicitly an ex-post framework) in which
financial institutions must proceed to monetary exchanges compatible with pre-committed
agreements and initial available endowments in operating cash flow. The purpose of Eisen-
berg and Noe (2001) is to derive the existence of a Clearing Payment Matrix (CPM), whose
1For a critical assessment of simulations in this literature, see Upper (2011).
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positive entries are the gross payments made from one institution to another and satis-
fying some constraints. First, Eisenberg and Noe (2001) state those constraints claiming
that "[their] model satisfies the standard conditions imposed by bankruptcy law". These
constraints are embedded by means of 4 axioms. Three are explicitly stated – Limited Li-
ability (LL), Absolute Priority (AP) and Proportionality (P) – and another one is implicit
in the solution concept – we call it Limited Payments (LP). Some of these axioms have
been widely discussed and challenged. AP has been relaxed to account for possible haircuts
and sunk costs (Rogers and Veraart (2013)), LL has been refined to deal with the case of
cross holdings (Helmut (2009)), and P must be modified for taking priorities among debt
holders into accounts.2 Given the four above axioms, Eisenberg and Noe (2001) provide a
proof of existence of a CPM and discuss the uniqueness of it. This original framework has
been extended to account for possible negative operating cash flows by Shin (2009) and
reinterpreted as a valuation model by Glasserman and Peyton Young (2015).
The main issue of the present paper is to examine the consequences of the axiomatic
approach proposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) on the set of defaulting firms. The sub-
prime mortgage crisis made clear that this set is of crucial importance. Indeed, recall
that Merrill Lynch has been purchased, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (who previ-
ously bought Bear Stearn) benefited from emergency lines of credit by the Federal Reserve
whereas Lehman Brother went bankrupt. A public bailout commitment raises of course
difficult incentive issues, but the consequences of large bank runs were famously recalled by
Ben Bernanke on September 18, 2008 with the dramatic statement: "if we don’t do this,
we may not have an economy on Monday". Hence, deciding which banks should be saved
and which should not is by no mean an easy question. However, it is one that must be
addressed. The direct gross financial consequences of possible bad decisions should not be
2In practice such priorities are the rule (for instance public institutions are served first) or may be part
of a justice decision. To treat all debt holders on equal ground is merely a theoretical simplification.
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overlooked. Recall the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) investment by the Federal
Reserve accounts for more than 400 billions of US Dollars and lasted about 6 years.3
Of course, in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), the identity of the defaulting firms is a conse-
quence of the characterized CPM. We make the choice in this paper to study axioms stated
on the CPM in light of their consequences on the implied set of defaulting firms. The first
question the present paper tackles is the independence of the axioms proposed by Eisen-
berg and Noe (2001) in terms of minimal (in the sense of inclusion) set of defaulting firms.
More precisely, we ask whether removing one or several axioms allows to reach smaller (in
the sense of inclusion) sets of defaulting firms. It turns out that AP is not independent
of other axioms in this sense. This result holds true even if we consider a different AP
and LL axioms as in Rogers and Veraart (2013). Second, we investigate the importance
of the LP axiom implicitly imposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Removing this axiom
(while keeping LL and P) does not allow to find a smaller (in the sense of inclusion) set
of defaulting firms than the one induced by the CPM characterized in Eisenberg and Noe
(2001). However, we may find other sets of defaulting firms (possibly smaller in the car-
dinal – or some size-weighted – sense). We also discuss various other possible conjectures
about the "usefulness" of other sets of axioms and provide several examples for the sake
of completeness of our study.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We display our model and explicit
axioms in Section 2. We give results in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Let N = {1, ..., N} be a set of firms. N is finite and fixed throughout this study. Notice
that, for the sake of simplicity and with no risk of confusion, we write N for both the set of
3This does not include the public takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac nor the so called "Maiden
Lane Transactions" programs.
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firms and the cardinality of this set. Each firm i ∈ N is initially endowed with an operating
cash flow ei. Let (ei)i∈N ∈ RN+ be the operating cash flow vector, one for each firm. Let
E = RN+ be the the set of all possible operating cash flow vectors. Firms are interconnected
with a nominal liability matrix (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ RN×N+ such that ∀i ∈ N,Li,i = 0. Then, for
any two firms i, j ∈ N , Li,j is the nominal liability of firm i towards firm j. Let L be the set
of all possible nominal liability matrices. We introduce the following notation: ∀S, T ∈ 2N ,
Li,S =
∑
j∈S
Li,j, LS,i =
∑
j∈S
Lj,i, LS,T =
∑
j∈T
LS,j and eS =
∑
j∈N
ej.
The first purpose of this study is the design of a clearing payment matrix (CPM),
X ∈ L. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let X ∈ L be a CPM. We say that
given L and X a firm is defaulting if its payments are not exactly equal to its nominal
liabilities. We call D(L,X) the set of defaulting firms. Formally,
D(L,X) = {i ∈ N,∃j ∈ N,Xi,j 6= Li,j}.
We call ND(L,X) the set of firms that are not defaulting, i.e.,
ND(L,X) = N \D(L,X).
Finally, we say that a firm is level-0-defaulting if its value of the equity (total payments
of others to it plus its operating cash flow minus its total payment to others) is negative
when L is used as a CPM. We call D(e, L) the set of level-0-defaulting firms. Formally,
D(e, L) = {i ∈ N,LN,i + ei − Li,N < 0}.
Finally, we consider two real numbers α, β such that 0 < α, β ≤ 1 fixed throughout this
study. α is interpreted as the fraction of the face value of the operating cash flow realized
on liquidation. β is interpreted as the fraction of the face value of the total nominal liability
to it realized on liquidation.
In order to be acceptable, we impose that the CPM satisfy some axiomatic conditions.
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The following conditions have been introduced explicitly or implicitly in Eisenberg and
Noe (2001).4
Axiom 1 (Limited Liability, LL)
Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let X = (Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈ L a CPM. X satisfies
Limited Liability if{ ∀i ∈ ND(L,X), Xi,N ≤ XN,i + ei and,
∀i ∈ D(L,X), Xi,N ≤ β.XN,i + α.ei .
Axiom 2 (Absolute Priority, AP)
Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let X = (Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈ L a CPM. X satisfies
Absolute Priority if
∀i ∈ D(L,X), Xi,N = β.XN,i + α.ei.
Axiom 3 (Proportionality, P)
Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let X = (Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈ L a CPM. X satisfies
Proportionality if
∀i, j ∈ N,
 Li,N > 0⇒ Xi,j =
Li,j
Li,N
.Xi,N and,
Li,N = 0⇒ Xi,j = 0
.
Axiom 4 (Limited Payments, LP)
Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let X = (Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈ L a CPM. X satisfies
Limited Payments if
∀i ∈ N,Xi,N ≤ Li,N .
Limited Liability imposes that no firm should have a negative value of the equity,
possibly even after liquidation in case of a default. Absolute Priority imposes that af-
ter payments are made, defaulting firms should be left with no value of the equity after
liquidation. Proportionality imposes that the payments to other firms made by any firm
4For AP and LL, we use the version given in Rogers and Veraart (2013). The Eisenberg and Noe
(2001)’s version of AP and LL correspond to the case α = β = 1.
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should be proportional to its nominal liabilities. Limited Payments imposes that the total
payments made by a firm should not exceed its total nominal liability.
Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let Γ be a set of axioms. Let D ∈ 2N
be a subset of N . We say that D is a Γ-solution to (e, L) if there exists a CPM X =
(Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈ L such that
1. X satisfies axioms in Γ,
2. D = D(L,X).5
We say that D is an optimal Γ-solution to (e, L) if D is a Γ-solution to (e, L) and for any
D′ ⊂ D, D′ is not a Γ-solution to (e, L). In this study, we will focus on optimal solutions
with one of the implicit objective of designing a CPM should be to try to minimize the set
of defaulting firms.
3 Results
The following proposition sums up or generalizes some results already given in Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart (2013) and that are relevant to our study in terms
of optimal sets of defaulting firms.
Proposition 1
Let 0 < α, β ≤ 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. The set of {LL,AP,P,LP}-
solutions to (e, L) is not empty. Moreover, if D ∈ 2N is an optimal {LL,AP,P,LP}-
solution, then
1. D(e, L) = ∅ if and only if D = ∅,
2. D(e, L) ⊆ D.
5In this case, with a lack of rigor, but with no risk of confusion we may say that D satisfies axioms in
Γ whereas it should be said that there exists a CPM X satisfying axioms in Γ such that that the set of
defaulting firms, when X is implemented, is D.
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Proposition 1-1 states that, if the nominal liability matrix L can be implemented as a
CPM without any defaulting firm, then L trivially satisfies axioms LL, AP, P and LP and
hence, D = ∅ is an optimal {LL,AP,P,LP}-solution. Obviously, the converse implication
trivially states that if D = ∅, then L is an optimal {LL,AP,P,LP}-solution, and LL implies
D(e, L) = ∅. Proposition 1-2 states that the set of level-0-defaulting firms is always con-
tained in the set of firms defaulting after the CPM is implemented if we impose that this
CPM satisfy LL, AP, P and LP.
As a first result, we will question the independence of the axioms in our study in
terms of set of defaulting firms. The following proposition shows that Axiom AP is not
independent when we consider optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solutions.6
Proposition 2
Let 0 < α, β ≤ 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. D ∈ 2N is an optimal
{LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L) if and only if D is an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to
(e, L).
Notice that Proposition 2 deals only with optimal solutions and not with solutions in
general. Obviously, the only if part of Proposition 2 still holds if the optimality feature is
not considered. However, Example 1 shows that the if part of Proposition 2 does not hold
when we consider solutions that are not optimal.
Example 1 Let 0 < α, β ≤ 1. Let N = 2, e = (2/α, 2/α) and L =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
Let us consider the CPM X =
(
0 1
0 0
)
. D(L,X) = {2}, and X satisfies LP,
P and LL. Hence, {2} is a {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). However, it is straight-
forward to check that {2} is not a {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L). Indeed, if
X ′ =
(
0 X ′1,2
X ′1,2 0
)
were to satisfy LP, LL, P and AP and D(L,X ′) = {2},
6Notice that we are not claiming that Axiom AP is not independent in some Eisenberg and Noe (2001)’s
results dealing with CPMs rather than sets of defaulting firms.
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we should have X ′1,2 = 1 and 2 + β = X ′2,1. In this case, X ′ would not satisfy
LP.
Notice however that, in this case, ∅ is both an optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution
and an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). 
Proposition 3 shows that when an optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution is found to a problem
with α = β = 1, removing Axiom LP does not help finding smaller (in the sense of inclusion)
optimal solutions.
Proposition 3
Let α = β = 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. If D ∈ 2N is an optimal
{LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L), then D is an optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
Let us clarify Proposition 3 and elaborate on it. Let us consider an operating cash
flow vector e and a nominal liability matrix L and let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LP,LL,P}-
solution to (e, L). By definition, it means that there exists a CPM X ∈ L satisfying P,
LP and LL and such that D(L,X) = D. Obviously, because X satisfies P and LL, D is
also a {LL,P}-solution to (e, L). However, since we removed axiom LP, and hence some
constraints on the CPM, we could hope that there exists another CPM X ′ ∈ L satisfying
LL and P only and such that D(L,X ′) ⊂ D. This is what Proposition 3 forbids: relaxing
Axiom LP does not allow to find a smaller solution to (e, L).
Notice that Proposition 3 does not necessarily hold when α and β can be smaller than
1 as can be seen in Example 2
Example 2 Let α = β = 1/2. Let N = 4, e = (1, 3, 8, 9) and L =
0 6 1 0
6 0 9 7
10 8 0 3
0 4 3 0
.
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Let us consider CPM X =

0 51/7 17/14 0
6 0 9 7
10 8 0 3
0 4 3 0
. It is straightforward to
check that X satisfies P, LL (and AP) and is such that D(L,X) = {1} and ∅
is not an {LL,P}-solution to (e, L). Hence, {1} is an optimal {LL,P}-solution
to (e, L).
Let us consider CPM X1 =

0 6x1 x1 0
6x2 0 9x2 7x2
10x3 8x3 0 3
0 4 3 0
 with x1 = 3353/11162,
x2 = 1685/11162 and x3 = 2567/11162. A bit of calculation shows that X1
satisfies LP, P, LL (and AP) and is such that D(L,X1) = {1, 2, 3}.
By Proposition 1-2, {1, 3} is not a {LP,P,LL,AP}-solution to (e, L). Hence, it
is not an optimal {LP,P,LL,AP}-solution to (e, L). Then, by Proposition 2, it
is not an optimal {LP,P,LL}-solution to (e, L).
Let us assume that {1, 2} is a {LP,P,LL}-solution to (e, L). Then, there ex-
ists X2 =

0 6x1 x1 0
6x2 0 9x2 7x2
10 8 0 3
0 4 3 0
 satisfying LP, P and LL and such that
D(L,X2) = {1, 2}. By P and definition of D(L,X2) we must have x1, x2 < 1.
Then, we have for firm 3, x1 + 9x2 + 3 + 8− 21 < 0. Then, X2 does not satisfy
LL. Then, {1, 2} is not a {LP,P,LL}-solution to (e, L). With the same type of
reasoning, we can show that no singleton is a {LP,P,LL}-solution to (e, L).
Let us assume that {2, 3} is an optimal {LP,P,LL}-solution to (e, L). By Propo-
sition 2, {2, 3} is an optimal {LP,P,LL,AP}-solution to (e, L) Then, there ex-
ists X3 =

0 6 1 0
6x2 0 9x2 7x2
10x3 8x3 0 3x3
0 4 3 0
 satisfying LP, P, LL, AP and such that
D(L,X3) = {2, 3}. SinceX3 satisfies AP, we must have
{
1/2(3 + 6 + 4 + 8x3)− 22x2 = 0
1/2(8 + 1 + 3 + 9x2)− 21x3 = 0 .
After computation, we must have x2 = 107/296 and x3 = 215/592. Computing
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the value of the equity of 1, 6.107/296 + 10.215/592 + 1− 7 = −118/592 < 0.
Hence, X3 does not satisfy LL. Hence, {2, 3} is not an optimal {LP,P,LL}-
solution to (e, L).
Then, {1, 2, 3} is an optimal {LP,P,LL}-solution to (e, L) and still, {1} is an
optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L). 
Notice that as straightforward corollary to Proposition 3, the result can be also stated
when optimal {LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L) are looked for.
Corollary 1
Let α = β = 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. If D ∈ 2N is an optimal
{LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L), then, D is an optimal {LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L).
Finally, notice also that Proposition 3 does not state that LP is irrelevant when studying
optimal {LP,LL,P}-solutions (or optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solutions) and when α = β = 1.
Indeed, Proposition 4 shows that the converse of Proposition 3 (and of Corollary 1) is not
true.
Proposition 4
Let α = β = 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L.
1) Let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L). D is not necessarily an optimal
{LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
2) Let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L). D is not necessarily an
optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
In order to prove Proposition 4, let us consider the following example.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, e = (1, 2, 2, 9) and L =

0 1 0 0
2 0 1 2
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
.
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Let us define CPM X1 =

0 5 0 0
2 0 1 2
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
.
It is straightforward to check that X1 satisfies LL and P. Also, we have, by
definition, D(L,X1) = {1}.
It is also straightforward to check that there exists no X ∈ L such that
D(L,X) = ∅. Then, {1} is an optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
Let us check that there exists no X = (Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈ L satisfying LP, P, LL and
such that D(L,X) = {1}. By LL, we should have XN,2 + e2−X2,N ≥ 0. Then,
by P, 1 +X1,2 + 2−5 ≥ 0 which cannot be satisfied if X1,2 ≤ 1, imposed by LP.
An optimal {LL,P,LP}-solution is {2, 3} withX2 =

0 1 0 0
22/14 0 11/14 22/14
13/14 13/14 0 13/14
1 0 0 0
.
It is unique as a corollary of some results of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). 
As can be seen from Example 3, imposing that a CPM X satisfy LL and P with
α = β = 1 only may have the consequence that a firm, not initially in D(e, L) (firm 1 in
this case) be "sacrificed" in order to have firms in D(e, L) not defaulting (firm 2 in this
case). This may be a normative undesirable consequence of imposing only LL and P. In
order to prevent this, we introduce Axiom I.
Axiom 5 (Inclusion of Level-0-Defaulting Firms, I)
Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let X ∈ L be a clearing payment matrix. X
satisfies Inclusion of Level-0-Defaulting Firms if
D(e, L) ⊆ D(L,X).
As a corollary to Proposition 3 and Proposition 1-2, we have the following result that
states that we cannot improve (in the sense of finding a smaller set with respect to inclusion)
an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution when searching for an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution.
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Corollary 2
Let α = β = 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. If D ∈ 2N is an optimal
{LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L), then, D is an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution to (e, L).
However, the following proposition shows that it is the only positive result when con-
sidering Axiom I.
Proposition 5
Let α = β = 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L.
1. Let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution to (e, L). D is not necessarily an optimal
{LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
2. Let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution to (e, L). D is not necessarily an optimal
{LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
3. Let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L). D is not necessarily an optimal
{LL,P,I}-solution to (e, L).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide an axiomatic analysis of the set of requirements which defines
a Clearing Payement Matrix in the framework proposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). This
set consists of four axioms: Limited Liability (LL), Absolute Priority (AP), Proportionality
(P) and Limited Payment (LP). The first three axioms are explicitly stated in Eisenberg
and Noe (2001), the last one is implicit. We investigate the consequences of these axioms
on the optimal sets of defaulting firms, i.e., the set of firms that are defaulting for a CPM
that satisfies the given axioms and that are minimal in the sense of inclusion.
We first show that AP is not independent of the other three axioms when studying the
optimal sets of defaulting firms. All the optimal defaulting sets (in the sense of inclusion)
for which a CPM satisfies LL, P and LP is an optimal defaulting sets for which a CPM
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satisfies LL, P, LP and AP (this results extends in the direction proposed by Rogers and
Veraart (2013)). Then, the optimality feature of these sets is unchanged whether AP is
imposed or not. Then, if one’s goal is to try to save as many firms as possible – without
adding extra money, of course – AP can be removed from the imposed requirements at no
cost and no gain.
Second, we show that further removing LP has a more subtle consequence. On the one
hand, it does not allow to reduce further the set of defaulting firms compatible with the
initial framework of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). On the other hand, there exist optimal
defaulting sets that satisfy LL and P but that do not satisfy LL, LP and P. Then, removing
LP could possibly lead to find optimal sets of defaulting firms which are different from those
provided in the initial framework. This result questions the relevance and justification of
LP and its link to some legal requirements.
The two above results are "universal" in the sense that they hold whatever the struc-
ture of the relationships between the financial institutions. We provide several further
counterexamples which basically show that no other universal results can be derived from
other weakening of the set of axioms.
We can see two limitations to our analysis. First, we focused on the set of defaulting
firms. Hence, we do not claim, for instance, that the CPM is unchanged when AP is
removed. In particular, we do not claim uniqueness of the CPM leading to our results in
terms of sets of defaulting firms. This certainly implies a weakness of our results in terms
of operational utility. In this line, this study should be seen more as a normative one than
a positive one.
Second, our study builds on the axioms introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001). These
axioms have been debated extensively in the literature and it is left for further research to
study how our results are modified when some other – and weaker – axioms are considered.
As an example, we kept the strong proportionality requirement (axiom P) along the whole
14
paper. It is not clear what results could be derived if we introduce seniority rules (as it is
done by Elsinger et al. (2006)), for instance.
Finally, we would like to conclude by saying that our paper shows that weakening
the set of constraints given in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) can lead to some new results in
terms of sets of defaulting firms. In the present paper, we only compared those sets with
the inclusion ranking. However, it may be the case that some of those sets present some
appealing features when the rank to compare sets of firms is more complete. This line of
study is left for the future.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Let 0 < α, β ≤ 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. The set of
{LL,AP,P,LP}-solutions to (e, L) being non-empty is a corollary of Rogers and Veraart
(2013).
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1-1
If: Let us assume D(e, L) = ∅. The proof is straightforward by showing that L satisfies
LL, AP, P and LP.
Only if: Let us assume that the empty set is a {LL,AP,P,LP}-solutions to (e, L), then,
there exists X ∈ L such that D(L,X) = ∅. By definition, X = L and hence, D(e, L) = ∅
follows from LL.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1-2
Let X = (Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈ L be a CPM satisfying LL, AP, P and LP and such that D(L,X)
is an optimal {LL,AP,P,LP}-solutions to (e, L). Let us assume that we can consider k ∈ N
such that k ∈ D(e, L) and k /∈ D(L,X).
Because X satisfies LL, we have
ek +XN,k −Xk,N ≥ 0
. Because X satisfies P and LP, ∀i ∈ N,XN,k ≤ LN,k and by definition of D(L,X),
Xk,N = Lk,N Combining, we must have
ek + LN,k − Lk,N ≥ 0
. This contradicts the assumption that k ∈ D(e, L).
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1
Let 0 < α, β ≤ 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let X ∈ L satisfying LP,
LL, P be such that D(L,X) is an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). Then, there exists
X ′ ∈ L satisfying LP, LL, P, AP and such that D(L,X ′) = D(L,X).
Proof of Lemma 1: Let X = (Xi,j)i,j∈D satisfy LP, LL, P and such that D(L,X) is
an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). If D(L,X) = ∅, AP is trivially satisfied and the
lemma is proved with X ′ = X. Then, let us assume D(L,X) 6= ∅. In the remainder of the
proof, let us write D = D(L,X) and ND = ND(L,X). Because X satisfies LP,
∀i ∈ D,Xi,N ≤ Li,N (1)
Moreover, because X satisfies LL and P,
∀i ∈ D,Xi,N − β.
∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
Xj,N ≤ α.ei + β.
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i,
∀i ∈ ND,Li,N −
∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
Xj,N ≤ ei +
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i
(2)
Now, let us consider the solution to the following linear program:
T = arg max
(X′i,N )i∈D
∑
i∈D
X ′i,N
subject to:
0 ≤ X ′i,N ≤ Li,N ∀i ∈ D
X ′i,N − β.
∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
X ′j,N ≤ α.ei + β.
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i ∀i ∈ D
Li,N −
∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
X ′j,N ≤ ei +
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i ∀i ∈ ND
(3)
Let us define X |D = (X |Di,N)i∈D with ∀i ∈ D,X |Di,N = Xi,N . By Equations 1 and 2, X |D
satisfies the constraints of the program in Equation 3. Moreover, these constraints clearly
define a compact set. Hence, the program in Equation 3 has a non empty set of solutions.
Let X = (X i,N)i∈D be a such a solution.
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Let us define XN = (XNi,j)i,j∈N be defined as ∀i ∈ N , i ∈ D ⇒ XNi,j = X i,N Li,j
Li,N
and
i ∈ ND ⇒ XNi,j = Li,j.
It is straightforward to check that ∀i ∈ D, X i,N = Li,N or X i,N − β.
∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
Xj,N =
α.ei + β.
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i (otherwise, increasing X i,N by a quantity small enough so that the
constraints of Equation 3 are still satisfied is possible and contradicts the assumption that
X is a solution to Equation 3). If ∃i ∈ D,X i,N = Li,N , thenXN is such thatD(L,XN) ⊂ D
and it is straightforward from the constraints of Equation 3 to check that XN satisfies LP,
P and LL7. Hence, a contradiction with the fact that D is an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution
to (e, L). On the contrary, if ∀i ∈ D,X i,N − β.
∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
Xj,N = α.ei + β.
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i, then
XN satisfies AP and the lemma is proved with X ′ = XN . 
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Let 0 < α, β ≤ 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L.
1) Let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L). Let us show that D is
an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
a) Let us show that D is a {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). By definition, there exists
X ∈ L such that
• X satisfies LP, LL, P, AP,
• D = D(L,X).
Then, by definition, D is a {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
b) Let us show that D is an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). In order to have a
contradiction, let us have D′ ⊂ D be a {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). Then, there exists
7Obviously, since 0 < α, β ≤ 1, if Li,N − β.
∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
Xj,N ≤ α.ei + β.
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i then, Li,N −∑
j∈D
Lj,i
Lj,N
Xj,N ≤ ei +
∑
j∈ND
Lj,i.
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X ∈ L such that
• X satisfies LP, LL, P,
• D′ = D(L,X).
Then, by Lemma 1, there exists X ′ ∈ L such that
• X ′ satisfies LP, LL, P, AP,
• D′ = D(L,X ′).
Then, D′ is a {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L), contradicting the assumption that D is an
optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L).
2) Let D ∈ 2N be an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). Let us show that D is an
optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L).
a) Let us show that D is a {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L). D being an optimal
{LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L) implies, by definition, that there exists X ∈ L such that
• P satisfies LP, LL, P,
• D = D(L,X).
Then, by Lemma 1, there exists P ′ ∈ L satisfying LP, LL, P, AP and such that D(L,X ′) =
D(L,X). Hence, by definition, D is a {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L).
b) Let us show that D is an optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L). On the contrary,
let us have D′ ⊂ D be a {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L). By definition, there exists X ∈ L
such that
• X satisfies LP, LL, P, AP,
• D′ = D(L,X).
Then, by definition, D′ is a {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L) contradicting the fact that D is
an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
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C Proof of Proposition 3
Let α = β = 1. Let e = (ej)j∈N ∈ E and L = (Li,j)i,j∈N ∈ L. Let D1 ∈ 2N be an
optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). By Proposition 2, D1 is an optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-
solution to (e, L). Assume, in contradiction with the proposition, that D2 ⊂ D1 is a
{LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
If D2 = ∅, then, LP is trivially satisfied and D2 is a {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L),
contradicting the assumption that D1 is an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). Then,
let us assume that D2 6= ∅.
Let X1 = (X1i,j)i,j∈N ∈ L be such that
• X1 satisfies LP, LL, P, AP,
• D1 = D(L,X1).
X1 exists since, by assumption, D1 is an optimal {LP,LL,P,AP}-solution to (e, L).
Let X be the set of clearing payment matrices X ∈ L such that
• X satisfies LL, P,
• D2 = D(L,X).
By assumption thatD2 is a {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L), X 6= ∅. For anyX = (Xi,j)i,j∈N ∈
X , let us define D2+(X) = {i ∈ D2, Xi,N > X1i,N}, D2−(X) = {i ∈ D2, Xi,N < X1i,N},
D2=(X) = {i ∈ D2, Xi,N = X1i,N}. Let us have X2 ∈ X such that ∀X ∈ X ,¬(D2−(X) ⊂
D2−(X2)). By definition, D2+(X2)∪D2−(X2)∪D2=(X2) = D2. Moreover, ifD2+(X2) = ∅,
X2 obviously satisfies LP which, together with the assumption that X2 satisfies P and LL,
contradicts the assumption that D1 is an optimal {LP,LL,P}-solution to (e, L). Hence,
D2+(X2) 6= ∅. (4)
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1) With a proof similar to the one of Lemma 1, we can show that we can consider, with
no loss of generality, that X2 is such that ∀i ∈ D2−(X2), X2N,i + ei = X2i,N .
2) Then, summing over D2−(X2), one obtains
LN\D1,D2−(X2) + LD1\D2,D2−(X2)+
X2D2=(X2),D2−(X2) +X
2
D2+(X2),D2−(X2) + eD2−(X2) −X2D2−(X2),N\D2−(X2) = 0. (5)
Moreover, since X1 satisfies AP and D2−(X2) ⊆ D2 ⊂ D1,
LN\D1,D2−(X2) +X
1
D1\D2,D2−(X2)+
X1D2=(X2),D2−(X2) +X
1
D2+(X2),D2−(X2) + eD2−(X2) −X1D2−(X2),N\D2−(X2) = 0. (6)
Since X1 and X2 satisfy P, by definition of D2=(X2) and D2+(X2), X2D2=(X2),D2−(X2) =
X1D2=(X2),D2−(X2) and X
2
D2+(X2),D2−(X2) ≥ X1D2+(X2),D2−(X2). Moreover, since X1 satisfies
LP, LD1\D2,D2−(X2) ≥ X1D1\D2,D2−(X2). Then, we necessarily have X2D2−(X2),N\D2−(X2) ≥
X1D2−(X2),N\D2−(X2). Together with the definition ofD
2−(X2), we must haveX2D2−(X2),N\D2−(X2) =
X1D2−(X2),N\D2−(X2) = 0. Hence,
∀i ∈ D2−(P 2),∀j ∈ N \D2−(X2), X1i,j = X2i,j = 0. (7)
By Equations 5 and 6, we have
∀i ∈ N \D2−(X2),∀j ∈ D2−(X2), X1i,j = X2i,j = 0. (8)
3) Since X1 satisfies AP,
X1D1\D2,N\D1 +X
1
D2−(X2),N\D1 +X
1
D2=(X2),N\D1 +X
1
D2+(X2),N\D1 − LN\D1,D1 = eN .
Since P 2 satisfies LL,
LD1\D2,N\D1 +X
2
D2−(X2),N\D1 +X
2
D2=(X2),N\D1 +X
2
D2+(X2),N\D1 − LN\D1,D1 ≤ eN .
By definition and the fact that X1 and X2 satisfy P, X1D2=(X2),N\D1 = X
2
D2=(X2),N\D1 ,
X2D2+(X2),N\D1 ≥ X1D2+(X2),N\D1 and since X1 satisfies LP, LD1\D2,N\D1 ≥ X1D1\D2,N\D1 .
Moreover, by Equation 7, X2D2−(X2),N\D1 = X
1
D2−(X2),N\D1 = 0. Then,
LD1\D2,N\D1 +X
2
D2=(X2),N\D1 +X
2
D2+(X2),N\D1 − LN\D1,D1 = eN , (9)
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LD1\D2,N\D1 = X
1
D1\D2,N\D1 , (10)
X2D2+(X2),N\D1 = X
1
D2+(X2),N\D1 . (11)
Because X1 satisfies LP and P and because X2 satisfies P, by definition of D1, Equation
10 implies
∀i ∈ D1 \D2,∀j ∈ N \D1, Li,j = X2i,j = X1i,j = 0. (12)
Also, by definition of D2+(X2), Equation 11 implies
∀i ∈ D2+(X2),∀j ∈ N \D1, X2i,j = X1i,j = 0. (13)
Moreover, since X2 satisfies LL, Equation 9 implies
X2N\D2=(X2),D2=(X2) + eD2=(X2) −X2D2=(X2),N\D2=(X2) = 0,
X2N\D2+(X2),D2+(X2) + eD2+(X2) −X2D2+(X2),N\D2+(X2) = 0,
and
X2N\(D1\D2),D1\D2 + eD1\D2 −X2D1\D2,N\(D1\D2) = 0.
4) We showed above that
X2N\D2=(X2),D2=(X2) + eD2=(X2) −X2D2=(X2),N\D2=(X2) = 0,
and by P 1 satisfying AP, we have
X1N\D2=(X2),D2=(X2) + eD2=(X2) −X1D2=(X2),N\D2=(X2) = 0.
The same reasoning as above shows that
∀i ∈ D1 \D2,∀j ∈ D2=(X2), Li,j = X1i,j = X2i,j = 0, (14)
and
∀i ∈ D2+(X2),∀j ∈ D2=(X2), X2i,j = X1i,j = 0. (15)
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5) Let us consider D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \D2). Because P 1 satisfies AP,
LN\D1,D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) +X
1
D2−(X2),D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2)+
X1D2=(X2),D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) −X1D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2),N\(D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2)) + eD2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) = 0.
After simplification using Equations 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15
LN\D1,D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) +X
1
D2=(X2),D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) + eD2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) = 0.
This implies
eD2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) = 0. (16)
and
LN\D1,D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) +X
1
D2=(X2),D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) = 0. (17)
The same reasoning with X2 gives
LN\D1,D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) +X
2
D2=(X2),D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) = 0. (18)
Equations 17 and 18 imply
∀i ∈ N \D1,∀j ∈ D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \D2), Li,j = X1i,j = X2i,j = 0, (19)
∀i ∈ D2=(X2),∀j ∈ D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \D2), X1i,j = X2i,j = 0. (20)
and since X1 and X2 satisfy LL,
∀i ∈ D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \D2),
X1D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2),i −X1i,D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) =
X2D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2),i −X2i,D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2) = 0
(21)
6) By Equation 4, D2+(X2) 6= ∅ and by definition of D2+(X2), ∀k ∈ D2+(X2), X2k,N >
X1k,N ≥ 0. Moreover, since X2 satisfies P, ∀k ∈ D2+(X2), Lk,N > 0. Then, we can consider
kmax ∈ D2+(X2) such that ∀k ∈ D2+(X2),
X2kmax,N
Lkmax,N
≥ X
2
k,N
Lk,N
.
Assume that
X2kmax,N
Lkmax,N
≤ 1. This implies that X2 satisfies LP, contradicting the fact
that D1 is an optimal {LP,P,LL}-solution. Then, let us consider
X2kmax,N
Lkmax,N
> 1.
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Now, let us define X ′ = (X ′i,j)i,j∈N ∈ L as:
∀i, j ∈ N,X ′i,j =
 X2i,j.
Lkmax,N
X2kmax,N
, if i ∈ D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \D2),
X2i,j , otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that X ′ satisfies P.
Let us show that X ′ satisfies LL. a) Let i ∈ N \ (D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \ D2)). Let us
define pi(i) = X ′N,i + ei − X ′i,N . By definition of X ′, pi(i) = X ′N,i + ei − X2i,N . By
Equations, 8, 12, 13, 14 and 15, pi(i) = X2N,i + ei − X2i,N . Then, LL is satisfied by i
for X ′ as it is for X2 by assumption. b) Let i ∈ D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \ D2). Let us define
pi(i) = X ′N,i + ei − X ′i,N . After simplification using Equations 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
19 and 20, pi(i) = X ′D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2),i − X ′i,D2+(X2)∪(D1\D2). By definition of X ′: pi(i) =
Lkmax,N
X2kmax,N
X2N,i −X2i,N . Then, LL is satisfied by i for X ′ as it is for X2 by assumption.
Let us show that X ′ satisfies LP. a) The proof is straightforward for all i ∈ N \
(D2+(X2) ∪ (D1 \D2)). b) Let i ∈ D2+(X2). X ′i,N = X2i,N .
Lkmax,N
X2kmax,N
. Then, by definition
of kmax, X ′i,N ≤ X2i,N .
Li,N
X2i,N
= Li,N . Then, LP is satisfied by i. c) Let i ∈ D1 \ D2.
X ′i,N = X2i,N .
Lkmax,N
X2kmax,N
= Li,N .
Lkmax,N
X2kmax,N
. Since,
Lkmax,N
X2kmax,N
< 1, X ′i,N < Li,N . Then, LP is
satisfied by i.
It is straightforward to check that, since (N \ D1) ∩ (D2+(P 2) ∪ (D1 \ D2)) = ∅,
D(L,X ′) ⊆ D(L,X1). It is also straightforward to check that kmax /∈ D(L,X ′), whereas by
definition, kmax ∈ D2+(X2) ⊆ D(L,X1). Hence, D(L,X ′) ⊂ D(L,X1) which contradicts
the fact that D1 is an optimal {LP,P,LL}-solution. This completes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 5
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, e = (1, 2, 3, 4) and L =

0 1 2 1
1 0 1 2
1 1 0 1
0 0 2 0
.
We have D(e, L) = {1}.
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Let us define the CPM X1 =

0 6/5 12/5 6/5
1 0 1 2
14/5 14/5 0 14/5
0 0 2 0
. X1 satisfies LL, P and I
and D(L,X1) = {1, 3} is an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution to (e, L).
Let us define the CPM X2 =

0 1 2 1
1 0 1 2
8/3 8/3 0 8/3
0 0 2 0
. X2 satisfies LL and P and
D(L,X2) = {3} is an optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L).
Let us define the CPM X3 =

0 11/15 22/15 11/15
14/15 0 14/15 28/15
1 1 0 1
0 0 2 0
. X3 satisfies LL, P
and LP and D(L,X3) = {1, 2} is an optimal {LL,P,LP}-solution to (e, L).
Then,D(L,X1) is an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution to (e, L) but is not an optimal {LL,P,LP}-
solution to (e, L) proving Proposition 5-1. D(L,X1) is an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution to
(e, L) but is not an optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L) proving Proposition 5-2. D(L,X2)
is an optimal {LL,P}-solution to (e, L) but is not an optimal {LL,P,I}-solution to (e, L)
proving Proposition 5-3.
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